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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The case

in

the

lower court was in the nature of a judicial

review of an administratively detennined child support debt in favor of
:he Defendant/Respondent pursuant to the Public Support of Children Act,
Chapter 45b, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court having reviewed the certified record of the
administrative proceedings and having heard argument by counsel, ordered
that

the Memorandum of Findings and Order previously entered by the

Administrative Law Judge be affinned. The District Court further ordered
that the case be remanded for further administrative hearings pursuant
to the Memorandum of Findings and Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks

reversal

of the ruling of the lower

court, thus barring Defendant from cl aiming any past child support from
Appellant, and for costs, etc.
Respondent seeks affirmation of the ruling in the District Court
below, sustaining the order of the Administrative Law Judge, and thus
proceeding with a determination of the amount owed
~ppel

to the State by

lant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

Appellant,

Roseann

Catt Karren, and Larry D.

Taber were

married, having three children born of that marriage, to-wit:
~l len,

David, and Kelsey.

Michael

Pursuant to a Divorce Decree, dated October

30,

1972,

the "care, custody, control and education" of

r~ichdel

\] ien

and David were awarded to Mr. Taber and the "care, custody, contr0: and
education" of Kelsey was awarded to the Appellant. The Divorce DecrPe
further

required

Mr.

Taber

to

pay

child

support of Thirty Doi lars

($30.00) per week to Appellant for the support of Kelsey.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 -Transcript of hearing).
Subsequently, Appellant had both physical and legal custody of
Kelsey until 1976. However, in an administrative hearing held before the
Honorable J.

Steven Eklund on June 4,

1981, Appellant testified that

since Mr. Taber had failed to pay child support as set forth

in the

Decree, Appellant relinquished physical custody of Kelsey to Mr. Taber.
According to Appellant, said transfer of custody would have occurred by
March of 1976.
During various months from March, 1976 through March, 1981,

~r.

Taber received public assistance which included support for the parties'
three minor children.

The amount of

such

public assistance rece1vPd

totalled Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy One and 73/100 OolLirs
(Pages

($11,871.73).

3-5

of

Transcript of Proceedinqs

-

Plaint1f~'s

Exhibit 3.)
Pursuant
investigator

to an assessment conference between

from

the

Office

of

Recovery

,~ppel

Services,

I ant and an

child

supp0rt

arrearages were assessed to be Thirty Five ($35.00) per child per "1011'.' 1
or a total of One Hundred Five Dollars ($105.00) per month. Based on

Ulf

total number of months during which Mr. Taber actually received publ 1 c
assistance,

the arrearage

sought would

be a total

of Three Thousanc

Eight Hundred Eighty Five Dollars ($3,885.00). (Plaintiff's cxh1b1t .1,

-2-

Pages 5 and 6 of Transcript of Proceedings.) As of this date, Appellant
has made no payment to the Office of Recovery Services in satisfaction
of any obligation to provide child support for her three minor children.
(Page 6 of Transcript of Proceedings.)
ARGUMENT
PARENTS HAVE THE PRIMARY DUTY OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR CHILDREN, AND
TYIS DUTY IS IMPOSED EQUALLY UPON BOTH FATHER AND MOTHER.
Today,

most jurisdictions either by statute or through common

law, cast upon both parents, according to their ability, the duty of
supporting their dependent minor children. Both the Utah courts and the
state

legistlature

mother

as

well

have

as

the

recognized
father

and articulated the duty of the

to

support

her

minor

children.

In

State Division of Family Services vs. Clark, 554 PZd 1310 (Utah, 1976),
the Utah Supreme Court stated in pertinent part: " ... one of the implied
promises in the marriage contract is to support any children that may
have been born into the family". In the Court's subsequent discussion of
the parents' duty of support, the Court continually referred to "their"
duty of support.
Furthermore,
r1>qu1res
financial

every

§78-45-4,

woman

to

Utah

Code

support

responsibility for

the

her

Anotated

dependent

(1953)

children.

as amended,
Thus,

the

support of children is a joint and

>everal obligation of both parents. As was stated in Owen vs. Owen, 579
r2a 911 (Utah, 1978):
"[U]nder our law both the mother and the father are
responsible for the support of the children. Therefore,
even though in the Decree the duty of support was placed
primarily and mostly upon the Defendant [who was, in that
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case, the father of the children], the trial court is not
necessarily obligated to continue that burden entirely
and exclusively upon him."
ARGUMENT II
A DUTY OF SUPPORT CONTINUES IN A DIVORCED MOTHER EVEN WHERE THc
FATHER HAS LEGAL CUSTODY OF THEIR CHILDREN.
As was pointed out under Argument I above, most jurisdictions now
have passed statutes requiring
along

with

the

husband.

that the wife contribute child support

In order to avoid conflict with

the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, statutes regarding child
support must

be

interpreted

child of divorced parents,

as

requiring the cost of supporting the

in the father's custody, to be apportioned

between the parents according to their means. (See Carter vs. Carter 397
NYS2d 88 (N.Y. APP., 1977).
The fol lowing cases have also recognized that a mother has a duty
to pay child support for her children who are in the custody of a former
husband proportionate to her financial ability: Kelley vs. Kelley 378 So
2d 1069, (1979, La. App.); Hennan vs. Hennan 310 NW 2d 911, (Mich. App,
1981);

Meysenburg vs. Meysenburg

303

NW2d

783,

vs. Coble 261 SE2d 34, (UC App .• 1979); Straub

VS.

('leb.

1981);

Coble

Tyahla 418 A2d 472,

(Pa. Super., 1980); and Bradshaw vs. Billips 587 SW2cJ Sl, (Tex Civ.

~pp.

11th Dist., 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court is

in accord as was evidenced by the•c

decision in Mccrary vs. Mccrary 599 P2d 1248, (Utah, 1979). In McCrar.r
(Id.)

a father had

modification

been awarded custody of the minor children in a

proceeding.

He was

subsist on disability income.

subsequently injured and reauirerl to

The Court helrJ that the loy;er Court did
-4-

not abuse its discretion in modifying the original Divorce Decree to
require that the fonner wife, who was not employed but had a substantial
bank account, contribute to the suport of the minors who were in the
father's custody.
In

Beasley vs. Beasley

159

NW2d

449,

(Iowa,

1968),

the Iowa

Supreme Court held that a mother had a duty to contribute to the college
education of her child whose custody had been awarded to the child's
father.
In re, Marriage of Muldrow, 132 Cal Rptr 48, (Cal. App., 1976),
the

California

Appel late

Court

held

that a trial

court abused its

discretion in a marriage dissolution proceeding by refusing to modify
the interlocutory decree so as to require the fonner wife to assist the
husband with the support of their four children who lived with him and
who were in his custody. In Muldrow the record had established the needs
of

the children and that the father was hard pressed to provide the

necessary amounts of food, clothing, and other items; whereas the mother
had the ability to do so.
ARGllMENT III
THE ABSENCIO OF A SUPPORT ORDER DOES NOT EXTINGUISH THE SUPPORT
il8Ll GATI ON OF PARENTS, PARTICULARLY WHERE A TH !RD PARTY SUPPLIES THE! R
IH~LDREN

\•ITH THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE.

Each

parents'

statutorily mandated obligation to provide child

support impliedly becomes a part of every Divorce Decree involving the
'-iel fare of the children of a marriage. (See Rose vs. Rose, 576 P2d 459
(Wyoming, 1978).

-5-

It must be recognized that public assistance has been provided ,,
the State of Utah for the support of the parties' three children.

:o

Lizotte vs. Lizotte 551 P.2d 137 (Wash. App., 1976), it was stated t•w.
"Public pol icy dictates that the primary obligation
for support and care of a child is by those who bring a
child into the world rather than on the tax payers of
the state. Therefore, parents have a duty to support
their children and cannot rid themselves of it by
transferring the duty to someone else."
While it is true that the general rule is that the Divorce Oecree
fixes the obligations of the parties, Stanton vs. Stanton 517 P.2d 1010
(Utah, 1974), and that where the circumstances would so justify, tne
trial court may relieve a parent from the obligation to provide C'1il0
support, Forbush vs. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, (Utah, 1978), a distinction
must be drawn between an express order of a District Court that a parent
is under no obligation to provide support for a cl11ld of the rnarnaqe,
as compared to the mere silence of a Divorce Decree as to whe>ther .Jny
child support obligation is imposed on the non-custodial parent.
The Divorce Decree in the instant case awarded the custody of t•.;o
of the parties' minor children to Mr. Taber. The Decree further iwar1e1
the custody

of

the

third

child

to Appellant and,

incident

t~errt~.

ordered Mr. Taber to pay child support. Based on the facts vihich existe·1
at the time of the entry of the Decree, that Decree is ~nders•dndabl;
silent as to the amount of any child support obliqation vihich woulj '"
owed by Appellant. However, events which have occurred subsequent to the
entry of the Decree (ie., the Plaintiff obtaining physical cus+o1_1
the

third

child

and

subsequently

included support for all

receiving

public

assistance,

1'

"hie·

three children) may properly give rise to a

-6-

possible obligation of the Defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for
the

public

assistance

which

was

provided

for

the

support

of

her

chl ldren.
In

Barrett vs. Barrett 39

P.2d

621,

(Ariz.,

1934),

the Court

stated that the provisions in the Divorce Decree awarding the custody of
the children to the mother and placing the duty of support exclusively
on her were binding, as between the father and the mother, until, by a
direct

proceeding

children;

modified,

but

they

did

not

extend

to

the

minor

the Court further held that the third person's knowledge of

tl1e Decree of Divorce and its terms concerning the property rights and
the custody of the children could not deprive him, if the other facts
JUSt1fied his giving support to the minors, of the right to maintain the
action;

and that his knowledge, at most, was that the terms of such

Decree were binding upon the parents and did not in any manner dispense
with their natural, moral, or legal duties to the children.
In Stech vs. Holmes 230 NW 326, (Iowa, 1930), the Court held that
notwithstanding that the parents of a minor child were divorced and the
custody of the minor child had been given to one of the parents, the
other

parent

was

liable

to

a

stranger

for

the

reasonable

value

of

necessities furnished to the child.
Utah law is in accord with the above jurisdictions. In Reese vs.
Mch1bald

311 P.2d 788,

child for hospital

(Utah 1957), a suit against the father of a

services rendered

to the child, whose custody had

been awarded to the Defendant's former wife by an Idaho Divorce Decree
which did not provide for support for the children,

the Court, after

pointing that the great weight of authority is that a father's obliga-

-7-

tion

[and

minor

likewise

children

is

a mother's
not

via statutory mandate]

changed

by

a Divorce Decree

tfl support '
vihich

1ives

1•,~

custody of the children to the wife [or the father] but ,Jues not menr1,;n
their support, stated that the
liable

[as

would

be a mother],

law is well

settled that a father ,,

even in the absence of an expresse~

contract, to a third person furnishing necessities to his [her] cn1lJ.
And more recently,
554

P.2d

1310,

(Utah

in

State Division of Family Services vs. Clark

1976),

the Utah Supreme Court held that the

absence of any prior adjudications as to the amount(s) fathers

shoul~

pay for support of their children did not preclude the State Division ut
Family Services from obtaining judgments against such fathers for tee
amount of support which it had furnished to such children.
Thus, the right of the State of Utah reimbursement for the
assistance which it has prov·1ded

in

~,ublic

this case is separate and apart fr,,,.

any alleged right of Mr. Taber to receive child support frori lp1•ellan•
for the benefit of the minor children in this matter.

ARGUMENT I 'I
THE FAILURE OF THE MICHIGAN COURT TO AWARD ANY ORDER OF SUPDQPT
IS NOT RES JUDICATA TO BAR ROSEANN CATT KARPEN'S LIAB'.L:Tv
FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF

P1

~O

T"E

s·~·.

8L '.C ASSISTANCE.

1

It has long been the law

in

many J1Jr1siictions

that a

·11.~rc 0

Decree is not res 1udicata concerning an award of support w1 to reqar~
third

parties

who

had

no

notice of

the

ori•Jinal

necree.

:n.1ee ·

Parks vs. Parks 272 SW 419, (Ky., 1925), the Kentucky Supreme C8urt ''"
that a Divorce Decree which aave custody to

d

wife but

JHJ

1
'

~ot ornv1, 1P

for the support of a minor child was res ~udicata as between tne ~us~and
-8-

dnd wife, but did not affect the rights of third parties against the
father. The Court went further to explain that it had not overlooked the
tact that the judgment was res judicata only to parties and privies;
however,

infant

children

were neither parties nor privies, nor the

subJect of barter.
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently recognized this general
principle
01odified

Knudson vs. Knudson, 660 P.2d 258 (Utah, 1983), the Court

in

its prior ruling

in Mecham vs. Mecham 570 P.2d 123, (Utah,

!977) which denied the State reimbursement for funds provided. The Court
1n Mecham (id.)

ruled that where the wife had sought temporary child

support

divorce

in

provision

the
for

such

proceeding

support,

the

and

the

Court's

matter was

res

Decree

made

no

judicata since the

Department's rights were derived through the wife. However, the Court in
Knudson (id.) specifically overruled Mecham and provided that where the
State had no notice of the original proceeding a claim by the State was
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The Court in Knudson held that where the Department of Social
SPrv1ces was not a party to the divorce action, the Divorce Decree was
not

res

Judicata

to

bar

the

divorced

husband's

liability

to

the

Oepartment for reimbursement of public assistance for child support paid
to the divorced wife during the pendency of a divorce, notwithstanding
r~at

the Divorce Decree made no mention of temporary alimony, child

support, or arrearages of either.
CONCLUSION
Clearly,
obligation

to

Appellant

has

both

a

common

law

and

a

statutory

support her children, which, for the purposes of this

-9-

proceeding, is neither reduced nor eliminated by whatever may be impl1er1
from

the

language

"responsible

of

parent",

the

parties'

within

the

Divorce
meaning

Decree.
of

Appellant

§78-45-b-2

Utah

1s

a

Code

Annotated (1953) as amended, which defines that tenn as "the natural or
adopive parent of a dependent child". Further, as stated in §78-45b-l.l
"It is declared to be the public policy of this
state that this chapter be liberally construed and
administered that children shall be maintained from the
resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving or
avoiding, at least in part, the burden often born by
the general citizenry through welfare programs."
For the above stated reasons and
cited,

Respondent

respectfully

submits

pursuant
this

to

Brief

the
in

authorities

support of its

prayer that the ruling in the District Court below be sustained.
Respectfully submitted this

~/\.v{

day of October, 1983

TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

-10-
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